Rules governing the conduct of elections have important consequences for democratic politics, and much can be learned from studying changes in electoral rules. Instances of change (or reform) allow us the possibility of examining how (or whether) new rules might create different outcomes. We begin with a discussion of how electoral reform might occur. We then consider the effects of two major changes in electoral rules -the adoption of proportional representation and the adoption of legislative term limits. We do this to assess whether these reforms have affected efficacy, trust, and voter participation. We suggest that reform efforts such as these may have only minimal effects on engaging citizens with politics.
One reason to expect that electoral reforms may not have much effect on trust, efficacy, and participation is that reforms are often introduced to further the interest of entrenched incumbents. Electoral rules are largely controlled by elected officials who hold office as a result of winning under status quo rules. As such, we might expect change of electoral rules to be particularly difficult; especially if these rules threaten the interests of incumbents. Given the incentives incumbents have for changing institutional arrangements only when it suits their interests (Prezworski 1991; Shepsle 2001; Boix 1999; Benoit 2004) , we might assume that most 'reform' in electoral rules reflects the interests of incumbents -or at least the interests of an influential incumbent faction. Ware (2002) offers this argument to explain the diffusion of the direct primary in the United States. Many other changes in electoral rules have been explained in terms of self-interested incumbents acting strategically -and at times pre-emptively -to change rules in anticipation of broader demographic trends that might work to their disadvantage (e.g. Angus 1952; Farrell and McAllister 2005) . The politics of redistributive institutions is evident in other discussions of election reform. Contemporary debates about the future of compulsory voting in Australia reveal the differential interests of the ALP and the Coalition, given that the practice appears to advantage the ALP (Mackerras and McAllister 1999) . In the US, questions about who may be registered on voter roles, and how far in advance they must register, create regular partisan divisions.
It is unlikely that every question of electoral reform fits perfectly into this description of redistributive institutions that have zero-sum properties. But many reform proposals have this quality. Indeed, it is difficult to think of questions about changes to electoral institutions where outcomes might be seen by interested parties as efficiency gains for everyone. Theories of electoral system change thus place great emphasis on incumbent self-interest as a reason why electoral rules remain static. Yet election rules do change in ways that are not always obviously in the interest of incumbents. What explains why, and when, electoral systems change?
Rules do change
There are some prominent examples where electoral reforms have been adopted that appear to run counter to incumbent self-interest -or at least counter to the interests of the majority coalition in power at the time. Some involve reforms pushed by forces somewhat external to the government. The direct initiative in the US is one rare mechanism that allows for an end-run around incumbents. The American experience provides several examples of initiatives being used to alter status quo rules governing political parties (Bowler and Donovan 2006) , to limit legislative tenure, and take reapportionment authority from the legislature. But examples of reforms promoted by direct voter initiative need not mean that theories of institutional change stressing incumbent self interest are flawed. In the United States, popular proposals to place limits on the length of legislative terms (Donovan and Snipp 1993; Karp 1995) have been resisted by incumbents in states that lack the constitutional initiative device.
Reforms that appear to be anti-incumbent and anti-party present an interesting question: why would representatives ever allow the introduction of new rules? Consider the adoption of direct democracy. Studies of attitudes of candidates and legislators demonstrate that, although outsiders might find the idea of direct citizen legislation appealing (Donovan and Karp 2006) , incumbent legislators do not (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2002) . Candidates for Parliament in Australia have been shown to have an interest in direct democracy that wanes when they are in government (Williams and Chin 2000) .
As much as these studies show incumbent resistance to change, change can serve incumbent interests at times. German political parties have promoted greater direct participation to increase the number of people engaged with parties (Scarrow 1999; . American parties regularly use the supposedly anti-incumbent initiative process to advance their objectives (Smith and Tolbert 2001) . Nor is it easy to separate incumbent self-interest from some incumbents' beliefs that a new electoral rules might promote normative goals of fairness or citizen engagement. Incumbent legislators' political ideology and personal values have been shown shape incumbents' preferences for certain electoral institutions. Regardless of incumbency status, politicians with post-materialists values are more supportive of some electoral rule changes, whereas political conservatives are less supportive (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2006 ). The point is that incumbent self-interest is not the sole explanation of when, and if, electoral reforms occur. Even rule changes that may have been motivated by the short-term gain of one party, such as adoption of STV for the Australian Senate, can be difficult to reduce to narrow partisan interest. But we must remember that self-interested incumbents do generally have substantial influence over how electoral rules are changed.
This being the case, should we really expect election reforms to have widespread transformative effects on trust, efficacy and political engagement in the public?
The limited scope of election reforms Does adoption of new election rules -rules that might in part be crafted to conform to the interests of some subset of political incumbents -have the potential to produce substantively important changes in how people are oriented toward politics?
Reform advocates often link normative assumptions about the benefits of proposed reforms to empirical claims about how their proposal will change mass behavior. Some make explicit claims about how new rules will affect citizens, representatives or both.
Many of these claims are testable, at least indirectly.
As examples, champions of proportional representation claim that the winnertake-all rules depresses participation in elections, because plurality systems discourage participation by political minorities who have no chance of electing like-minded representatives (Amy 1994) . By presenting more choices, PR is also expected to encourage more people to have attachments to a political party. Proponents of the use of direct democracy employ a similar logic. They claim the process of making choices over ballot questions can make citizens learn more about politics, and become more engaged with elections (see examples from Smith and Tolbert 2004) . Implicit in these expectations is that a reform produces some normative gain by changing how people behave or how they are oriented to politics. These are not isolated examples. Advocates for term limits claimed that limits can make elections more competitive, improve the quality of candidates seeking office, reduce the power of narrow interest groups (Fund 1992) , enhance the ability of women and minorities to win office, reduce levels of cynicism in the mass public, and increase participation ).
Many reform advocates place priority on normative goals, such as procedural fairness, equal rights, and improvements in the quality of democracy. Advocates of proportional representation and term limits made explicit claims about how these reforms should alter behavior. The politics of election reform thus merges important normative questions with positive questions about how changes in electoral institutions will somehow alter human behavior.
There are numerous studies assessing how differences in electoral arrangements correspond with variation in how people behave and how they are oriented to politics. In fact, for some of the assumptions that reform advocates advance, we have a pretty good understanding how different rules that exist in various places are associated with different outcomes. As we discuss below, however, much less in known about whether or not changes in rules that exist in a particular place can cause a change in political behavior.
Much of our understanding of the potential effects of election reforms is based on crosssectional studies; fairly little comes from studying the effects of particular rules changes over time. The issue of endogeneity thus inhibits our understanding of how much of a substantive effect we might expect when any election reform is adopted.
At the same time, we know fairly little about how effects of engaged with politics at the moment their nation changes from plurality to PR rules, or when term limits suddenly make an uncontested seat competitive. But by how much, and do we expect such events to have permanent effects on citizens, effects that transform them and leave them more interested in politics and more efficacious? How much, exactly, does the adoption of major reforms such as proportional representation or term limits actually affect political engagement and participation?
Proportional Representation
Even the most sophisticated studies of the effects of PR have difficulty with causality and endogeneity: Did nations with traditions of greater civic engagement or more participatory cultures end up adopting PR, or does the adoption of PR have a predictable causal effect on engagement and participation, independent of the forces that led to its adoption? But, leaving this to one side for a moment, PR is expected to hold a number of consequences for a political system. First and foremost, we should see an increase in the number of political parties after PR is adopted. But a number of other consequences should follow on from this. More parties may lead to more campaign activity, which could stimulate voter interest. Simply having new choices on a ballot may empower people who were not previously engaged established parties. This could make people who were previously not voting become more interested, and more likely to vote. There is ample cross-sectional empirical evidence that nations with PR rules have higher turnout (see Blais 2006 for a review). Cross-national research also demonstrates that people report more attachments to parties and higher political efficacy in nations that use PR, and that supporters of smaller parties are more efficacious and more likely to vote in PR nations than in places using plurality/majoritarian rules (Banducci and Karp 2008) . We can begin examining these expectations with the simplest one: a rise in the number of parties. 1981 under plurality. We must ask then, how much the change from voting for a third party that likely did not win seats, to a voting for one that did, actually affected how much people were engaged with their political system. Second, changing the electoral system may provide a sufficient condition for party system change -but it is not a necessary condition for change. Social change can also bring about changes in the party system. Indeed a lot of the recent work on Duverger's law (e.g., Clark and Golder xxxx) stress the interaction between electoral system and the social system. One example of this comes from Germany where the MMP electoral system has remained largely unchanged during the period displayed in Figure 1 -yet the party system has undergone major change: what seemed to be a stable 3 party system of CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD is now a 5 party system. A jump from 3 to 5 parties in the legislatures may not seem especially dramatic, particularly when we consider the size of the exogenous shock imparted by re-unification of East and West Germany. Figure 2 demonstrates that the change in number of parties understates the change in the German party system. The drop in the vote share of the two largest parties (the right hand scale marks the SPD and CDU/CSU seats total combined; the left hand scale the number of parties, repeating the pattern from the previous graph) has been especially dramatic over the last decade. The exogenous shock of re-unification may well be the cause of most or even all of that change in the party system, but what is clear is that any increase was not brought about by electoral system change. There were other positive signs: more people trusted political parties after 1996 than before, fewer said that government was ran by a few big interests, fewer said MPs were out of touch, and substantially fewer (17%) said they had no say two elections after PR was adopted (Vowles et al 2006) . Some of these effects are relatively modest, 2 and others are difficult to separate out from economic trends that correlate with trust and satisfaction. However, despite what PR advocates suggest attachments to parties eroded gradually in New Zealand over the two consecutive elections held after 1996, never returning to the levels recorded prior to 1990 (Aimer and Vowles 2003) . Measures of satisfaction with democracy were also lower at the two elections conducted after 1996.
Cross-sectional evidence shows PR associated with greater turnout. But crosssectional data -as we noted above -has the problem of endogeneity that can really only be addressed by looking over time where PR has been adopted. Adoption of PR clearly increases the numbers of parties winning seats. However, the effects of an increase in numbers parties in a legislature on how citizens interact with the political system (e.g., on participation and efficacy) appear less than clear.
Looking at the effects of shifts to and from PR is complicated by the fact that other than the case of New Zealand, there are very few (if any) well-documented cases that allow us to look for before and after effects. The other examples we have looked atfrom Australia, Germany, and the UK -do seem to provide a consistent pattern. The cases are consistent in not showing clear effects of electoral system change.
Term Limits
The adoption of term limits in American states in the 1990s provides another 'before and after' opportunity to study the effects of a major election reform on Through a chain of changes, then, term limits were to improve turnout and trust.
Term limits break incumbent advantages by forcing increased turnover of incumbents, which should produce more competitive elections. The increase in the number of races with no incumbent should stimulate more campaign activity, boost voter interest, and also make representatives more responsive. Some term limits advocates also claimed limits would reduce campaign spending, produce representatives who were less parochial, and eliminate 'career politicians' and generally improve the quality of representation Fund 1992) . (Kousser 2005) but rather than putting an end to career politicians they may have shuffled ambitious politicians from lower offices into term limited legislatures, and from the legislature to other offices (Carey et al 1998; Powell 2000) . There are no differences between limited and non-limited states in the type of people who seek office (Carey et al 2006) . There is evidence that term limited legislators are less informed, and thus less able to address state-wide issues (Powell et al 2007) .
Given this muted effect on electoral competition, how much did the adoption of term limits affect voter participation? Term limit reformers expected that a new level of electoral competition caused by "leveling the playing field" would boost voter interest.
This assumes that a large proportion of incumbents were actually staying in office longer than the limits, which typically restrict terms to three or four two year terms in the lower Open seat contests are known to attract quality candidates (Jacobsen and Kernell 1983:32) , and involve more campaign spending (Jacobsen and Kernell 1983:41 ). Yet, although term limits forced many incumbents out, they do nothing to affect the distributions of voters in legislative districts. Many districts are composed of an overwhelming majority of voters who support one dominant party. These likely remained safe for that party's new candidate in the general election when an incumbent retired.
This being the case, term limits can occasionally make some party nomination contests more competitive, but effects on general election turnout could be limited given the fact that large proportions of state legislative districts are safe for one of the two major parties.
There is little in Figure 6 One final point brings us back to California, home of one of the earliest and more stringent term limit reforms. Proponents of the California reform claimed that by weakening "special interests" and empowering "citizen legislatures," limits would rebuild trust and increase popular regard for the legislature. Again, data are hard to come by and it is difficult to assess the effects of any reform in isolation. Still, evidence that is available does not offer much support for these claims. Figure 8 plots the trend in public approval of the California legislature from 1997 to 2006, with multiple opinion polls conducted most years. The series begins the year the legislature was first affected by term limits. As can be seen, there has been a strong trend downwards in regard for the legislature. As more incumbents were limited out, public regard for the legislature declined steadily.
Why effects of reforms are limited
Election reforms -at least the two examined here -have not really worked to the extent that was anticipated. Reformers could, quite plausibly, advance a counter-factual argument: "were it not for reform x then the [drop in turnout / decreased efficacy/ diminished regard for the legislature] would have been much worse." This is a difficult argument to assess. It is also a much weaker claim for reform. What does seem to be the case is that these election rules changes have not had much impact on mass behavior and attitudes. There may be a number of reasons for this.
First, much of the impetus for reform may come from people who have an overly optimistic view of politics. Less charitably, proponents of some electoral arrangements may have incentives to make over-blown, civic-minded claims about the effects of their proposals in order to mask instrumental motivations. Proposals to advance proportional representation sound more fair-minded when framed as a way to enhance civic engagement than when framed as a strategy to strengthen the hand of smaller parties trying to secure seats in parliament. Term limits were largely promoted by well-funded conservative activists frustrated with Democratic majorities in the US Congress and most state legislatures (Benjamin and Malbin 1992) . Republicans were generally more supportive of term limits than Democrats in the 1990s 8 (Donovan and Snipp 1994) , but an overtly strategic, partisan argument could have been less successful than one appealing to fairness and civic virtues. If instrumental motives are the primary force driving electoral reforms, and claims about civic engagement are at least partially rhetorical, than it may be no surprise that reforms show a limited capacity to build efficacy and participation.
Second, the expectation that changes in electoral institutions have substantial effects on political engagement may simply be wrong. Politics -particularly the parts affected by electoral rules -is a very small piece of all the factors that affect how most people view their world. Moreover, the manner in which people interact with and understand how votes are translated into seats via elections might be a rather small part of how they view politics. Larger forces include personal relationships, families, jobs, job searches, bills to pay, retirements to plan, chances for education, access to government services, and myriad other concerns. Direct experiences with government as a taxpayer or as a person seeking services, and indirect experience via mass media, may have larger consequences than electoral rules in shaping political trust and efficacy. Interpersonal trust is known to be built upon a host of broad life experiences, and, independent of experiences with electoral politics, is a strong predictor of trust in government. (Donovan et al 2007) . Perceptions of public corruption that are difficult to connect to electoral arrangements also affect trust in government. Is a relatively small force, such as adding one or two more parties to a legislative chamber, or limiting legislative tenure, ever going to be of enough consequence to rival the effects of these larger forces that shape efficacy, trust, and political engagement? These core attitudes are also formed as a result of childhood socialization, education, income, life security, occupation, age, etc. Compared to all of these larger forces, how much can experiencing a competitive election, or a multiparty system in one chamber of a legislature, affect efficacy and trust for most people?
Third, incumbents still have much control over what is adopted in the name of reform. Given that self-interested incumbents often have a hand in designing electoral reforms, the substantive scope of reforms may be quite limited. Proportional representation might change a party system only slightly, moving it from two parties, to two large parties and a handful of minors. Even the rules written to spite incumbents can be weak agents of change, and thus have weak potential to engage new voters. Term limits do not address what may be the root causes of incumbent advantages: safe partisan districts and incumbent advantages in fundraising. As such, they simply replace one set of relatively safe incumbents with another.
In sum, electoral reforms that are aimed at increasing trust, efficacy and participation may be running against much more powerful political and social tides.
Although support for basic democratic processes remains stable, citizens in many of the world's advanced democracies -regardless of electoral arrangements -have weaker attachments to parties than in previous generations. Trust was eroding at similar rates in many nations as cynicism increased. Confidence in political institutions has eroded in a host of advanced democracies (Dalton 1999) . For several decades, voter turnout has been in decline in many nations (Scarrow 2002; Dalton 2004 ). Whatever it is that is driving these behavioral and attitudinal changes, the fact they are so widespread, and occur across places with such a range of electoral arrangements, suggests that electoral institutions alone may not be the cause, nor the cure, to changes in how contemporary citizens view their political world. 1973-77 1975-79 1979-82 1982-85 1985-88 1989-92 1993-6 1996-99 2001-03 2006-7 2008-10 Victoria ( 
